The 30th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) concluded in Belém, Brazil. One of the main milestones was the decision to advance in the development of a just transition mechanism, an important step to ensure that human rights are at the center of the climate agenda.

However, substantial disagreements persist regarding the phase-out of fossil fuels and the definition of clear financing targets, which shows that reaching global climate consensus continues to be a complex terrain filled with disputes.

A Just Energy Transition

One of the central axes of this COP30 was the debate around the Just Transition Work Programme, a space that produced significant progress in terms of rights. The final text incorporated strong language on gender, human rights, free, prior and informed consent, and the self-determination of peoples – long-standing demands from social organizations and communities affected by the climate crisis.

Countries also agreed to advance the development of a just transition mechanism, a tool long demanded by civil society. This instrument aims to strengthen international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building, and knowledge exchange to promote equitable, inclusive, and fair transitions. Its goal is to guarantee support for the development and implementation of transformation plans in sectors such as energy and agriculture, placing workers and communities impacted by the transition at the center.

However, these advances coexist with critical absences. Two key issues debated during negotiations were not reflected in the final decision: the need to move toward a progressive phase-out of fossil fuels and the recognition of the socio-environmental risks associated with mineral extraction for the energy transition. Both points appeared in earlier drafts and were backed by numerous countries and civil-society networks, but were ultimately excluded due to geopolitical tensions among fossil-fuel producers, major mineral-consuming countries, and the Global South nations whose territories bear the impacts.

Fossil fuels—coal, oil, and gas—remain at the heart of the problem: they generate more than 75% of global greenhouse gas emissions and nearly 90% of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere, according to the United Nations. Leaving the principal cause of global warming out of a COP political declaration, particularly one held in the Amazon during the warmest year on record, highlights the depth of the multilateral crisis.

But even a rapid phase-out of fossil fuels would not resolve the tensions on its own. If the energy transition is conceived merely as a technological replacement to meet international commitments, it runs the risk of reproducing the same extractivist model under a new guise. This logic increases pressure on territories, deepens biodiversity loss, and worsens human-rights violations and impacts on the ecosystems that sustain life.

Minerals such as lithium and copper are increasingly sought by Global North countries to drive the energy transition and electromobility. Added to this is the growing demand for minerals required by the expansion of the digital economy, data infrastructure, and the military and aerospace industries. Extractive pressure is expanding and accelerating.

This scenario presents one of the greatest challenges for countries of the Global South: minerals are extracted from their territories, damaging ecosystems and affecting local communities, all in the name of an energy transition that primarily benefits the Global North.

The world is advancing in recognizing rights, participation, and climate justice, yet still fails to agree on the most fundamental point: progressively phasing out fossil fuels and preventing the transition from reproducing historical inequalities. The coming years will be decisive.

Adaptation

Despite having been presented as the “COP of Adaptation,” COP30 closed with progress that is insufficient in the face of climate urgency. The main achievement was the completion of the UAE–Belém Work Programme and the adoption of an initial set of indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). However, the result leaves a substantial workload ahead of 2026 to strengthen its robustness, legitimacy, and real capacity for measurement. The process generated broad frustration — particularly due to the lack of transparency and the way indicators were reviewed — once again highlighting the gap between the expectations of developing countries and the actual pace of negotiations.

“Progress was also made on new guidelines for National Adaptation Plans, and follow-up on Adaptation Communications was maintained. Meanwhile, the Adaptation Fund remained stagnant due to governance disputes and insufficient resources.

Financing

As in every COP, financing cuts across all discussions. The final outcome was weakened on the last night of negotiations: the commitment to double adaptation finance by 2025 was reiterated, and a call was made to “at least triple” adaptation finance by 2035, a more distant deadline than the one advocated by developing nations. Although this target serves as a minimum baseline and an explicit call for developed countries to continuously increase their contributions, the progress falls short of the necessary ambition.

A two-year work programme on climate finance was also established, which will include specific discussions on the provision of public resources under Article 9.1. However, the text is far from constituting an ambitious finance package. Although it reaffirms the need to mobilize at least USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035, it does not establish concrete implementation mechanisms or accountability measures to guarantee that these resources will materialize.

Although the results from Belém establish an initial platform on which to build in 2026, the real test will be transforming these commitments into measurable actions, adequate financing, and an adaptive architecture capable of responding to the growing needs of the most vulnerable countries.

Argentina at COP30: No Clear Targets and Contradictory Signals

Argentina’s participation at COP30 exposed the deterioration of its climate policy. The country arrived in Belém without presenting the updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0) — which should have been delivered in February — and failing to meet transparency and participation standards established by both national legislation and the Escazú Agreement.

Although the government convened online dialogue spaces prior to the COP, these spaces lacked real participation: closed chats, an absence of questions, and no involvement from the External Advisory Council. As a result, Argentina arrived at the summit with no clear targets, no roadmap, and no document to guide its climate action.

This was compounded by contradictory participation by Argentina during negotiations. In adaptation discussions, Argentina maintained its historic profile: it did not obstruct debates and supported consensus aimed at strengthening the resilience of the most vulnerable countries. However, in just transition discussions, its position shifted noticeably: it adopted restrictive stances on gender and human-rights issues.

What happened in Belém reveals the urgent need to reestablish climate institutional capacity, guarantee public participation, increase transparency, and align foreign policy with international standards of equity and climate justice. Only with strong institutions, serious targets, and a coherent alignment between external negotiations and domestic implementation can Argentina regain credibility and address the climate crisis fairly.